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non-binding and incremental approach, the Workshops were instrumental in building trust and confidence among the claimants and in getting them to consider cooperative measures in areas of common interest.
As alluded to in the Introduction to this book, the debate surrounding the South China Sea is evolving to the point where a meaningful discussion on implementing joint development of hydrocarbon resources is not only possible but increasingly critical.
3 Indeed, there are compelling reasons why the claimants should begin discussion on how to set aside their sovereignty and maritime disputes and pursue joint development. The objective of this volume was to examine existing joint development arrangements in the region to determine whether there were any useful lessons that could be used to further discussion on joint development in the waters in To this end, Part I of this Chapter will first highlight key economic, legal and political factors that influenced States in Asia to enter into joint development arrangements and the challenges that need to be overcome before joint development can be contemplated in the South China Sea. Part II will then set out recommendations on how the claimants can move forward on joint development. 5 Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority, 30 May 1990 [1990 
Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and the Kingdom of Thailand on the Establishment of a Joint Authority for the Exploitation of the Resources in the Sea-Bed in a Defined

Area of the Continental Shelf of the Two Countries in the Gulf of Thailand, 21 February 1979 (entered into force 24 October 1979) and Agreement between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand on the Constitution and Other Matters relating to the Establishment of the
I. Economic Factors
A.
The Oil Imperative
The global economy continues to rely on hydrocarbons and particularly oil and natural gas as key energy carriers. This is particularly the case for liquid fuels where oil remains critical. Overall, global demand for oil shows little sign of waning and instead continues to escalate despite deepening concerns over the availability of supplies to meet these requirements.
East and Southeast Asia features numerous States that are energy hungry yet simultaneously energy resource poor, especially with respect to oil. This uncomfortable equation has already led to significant dependence on imported oil within these regions.
Leaving aside the prevailing imperatives of adhering to longstanding sovereignty claims, these escalating energy security concerns go a long way to explaining why many coastal States have been enthusiastic in terms of advancing claims to maritime space and vigorously defending those claims. When set against this context, the potential existence of relatively 'close to home' sources of seabed energy resources underlying the disputed waters in Asia is highly attractive and serves as a potent driver in the intransigent positions maintained by States in their maritime disputes. However, the same factors can also serve as persuasive motivators to enter into maritime joint development arrangements. Consequently, it is projected that, with the exception of Brunei, the claimants' dependence on oil imports, which is already significant for several of them, is highly likely to increase significantly in the future. Forecasting on a 'business as usual' basis suggests that oil imports are set to climb steeply to approximately 4,500Mb by 2020, assuming that such supplies are available to import.
14 Given the challenges that the South China Sea States are facing with respect to meeting their current and projected future energy, and especially oil, demands, it seems likely that accessing South China Sea seabed oil and gas reserves, should they indeed exist, will likely be viewed as a strategic priority with a view to addressing increasingly pressing energy security concerns. Indeed, given the multitude of overlapping claims and the concomitant difficulties in the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons, the pressing energy needs of the claimants may serve as a critical incentive for some form of co-operation on hydrocarbon resources in the South China Sea.
B.
Location of Hydrocarbon Resources
Where the presence of seabed energy resources is suspected within an area of overlapping maritime claims but the precise location, let alone the scale, of these suspected resources is unknown, often proves to be a double-edged sword. This scenario prevails in many areas subject to competing maritime claims, including in the South China Sea, primarily because insufficient exploration activity has taken place precisely because of conflicting claims to maritime jurisdiction.
On the one hand, suspicions over the presence of valuable seabed energy resources can provide a crucial impetus encouraging parties to either settle their disputes, for instance through maritime boundary delimitation. On the other hand, the prospect of the discovery of such new deposits, coupled with uncertainty over their location and scale, can act as a major impediment to dispute resolution. This is largely because of the fears that arise over the compromises entailed in delimiting a boundary line and the possibility that parties may subsequently discover that the resources at stake have ended up wholly or partially on the 'wrong side of the line'. Similarly, the same concern tends to encourage States to advance maximalist claims, something that again makes compromise and thus dispute settlement, more difficult. Under these circumstances, a joint development option may well prove to be attractive as the parties are then guaranteed at least a share of any resources that may indeed be present. In the South China Sea context, although many commentators have, over the years, suggested that this region and particularly its disputed spaces are 'oil rich', it should be emphasised that estimates as to the seabed energy resource potential vary wildly and are generally highly speculative in nature. Significant confusion also persists in relation to oil reporting with resource estimates (that is, the volume of oil in the ground) and reserve estimates (that is, the proportion of the oil that can be recovered given oil price and technological constraints) being frequently, and erroneously, used interchangeably. This tends to lead to estimates as to the oil and gas potential of the South China Sea to be significantly inflated.
In order for oil to be present, three key geological factors are necessary -a highly porous and permeable sedimentary reservoir, organic rich source rock and a low permeability seal or capping rock. The presence of these three geological 'play elements' does not, however, guarantee the presence of oil. However, their absence strongly suggests that oil will not be present -a situation that exists in much of the central part of the South China Sea which comprises oceanic crust.
In fact, it has been suggested that the South China Sea is likely to be a predominantly gas rather than oil province. This has implications for the attractiveness of the resources at stake and also whether they can be readily recovered. While oil and gas are often considered together, it is important to distinguish between them. Although gas can be used as an alternative to oil, for instance as a transport fuel, in reality there are major impediments to this occurring in the near-term. This is especially the case as a consequence of the 'lock in' effect of existing transportation technologies where the lead time required to change vehicle fleets across to new fuels is substantial (of the order of 15 years for cars, 25 years for buses, and 40 years for aircraft). There will be significant implications for the development of hydrocarbons if the disputed waters of the South China Sea should yield more natural gas rather than oil. Moreover, it is also worth noting the long lead times involved from discovery of hydrocarbons reserves to the extraction of 'first oil'.
This, in turn has implications for the role of South China Sea hydrocarbons in the context of increasingly urgent regional and global energy security worries. That said, rapidly improving technology, coupled with rising oil prices will strengthen the business case for oil exploration and development in deeper and more challenging environments more remote from shore. Further, the price-reserve relationship will shift such that presently non-commercially attractive reserves will become increasingly viable to exploit.
It is clear that the lack of knowledge about the location, as well as the nature of resources in the South China Sea, attributable to the overlapping claims, is an obstacle to the joint development of resources by the claimants. Because the presence of hydrocarbon resources is, at least publicly, speculative.
C. The Need for Jurisdictional Certainty and a Secure Investment Framework
Exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources in offshore areas is a capitalintensive venture which usually requires the backing of private oil companies, notably in terms of both funding and technical expertise. However, the lack of political, legal and fiscal certainty in an area claimed by two or more States is a major and often been subject to strong protests by China. This highlights the difficulties that oil companies face in even undertaking survey activities in the South China Sea, let alone embarking on large-scale exploitation and development of any discoveries made, including the sustained investment that this would inevitably entail.
D. Marked Asymmetries in Capacity
There is sometimes an incentive either for two States to pool their expertise as well as their sovereign rights for the purposes of cooperative joint development or, alternatively, for less developed States to enter into a joint development arrangement with another State which has more developed petroleum expertise, legislation and infrastructure. Arguably, an important factor underpinning the conclusion of some of the co-operative arrangements in Asia was the need of one of the States concerned for assistance in developing hydrocarbon resources, ranging from technical or financial matters, to infrastructure, petroleum laws or human resources. Joint development zones are usually either located in addition to a boundary line or in areas of overlapping claims and in some instances constitute the whole overlapping claim area. It is axiomatic that clearly defined areas of overlapping claims significantly contribute to the conclusion of joint development arrangements.
Further, not only must they be clearly defined, they must have some basis in international law. Indeed, it is worth noting that when making claims to maritime It is therefore very clear that the claims in the South China Sea have not been defined or justified to the degree of certainty necessary before joint development arrangements can take place.
B. Sovereignty Disputes over Offshore Features
Sovereignty disputes over offshore features were only an issue in two of the co- This is an exceptional case in State practice on joint development in Asia. Instead of preserving its claims in the joint development zone, Malaysia gave them up in exchange for being allowed to participate in the joint development of resources in the overlapping claim.
In the South China Sea of course, the sovereignty disputes over the Spratly features dominate the discourse and are not only bilateral, but can involve as many as six (6) parties. This is a major obstacle to joint development. Not only does this make defining the area of overlapping claims difficult, it enhances the possibility that any joint development arrangement will be perceived by national electorates as a 'surrender of sovereignty' over the features. In this regard, it is worth noting that States do not have to give up or surrender sovereignty over offshore features or their sovereign rights over adjacent waters when entering into joint development arrangements. As noted above and as explored in further detail in Chapter 5, 42 these claims can be preserved and protected by 'without prejudice' clauses in the joint development arrangement itself.
C.
Claims of Third Party States
Two 
III. Political Factors
A.
Good Relations between States
Overlapping maritime claims can serve as a major source of tension in relations between neighbouring States which can spill-over into other areas in bilateral relations. Co-operative arrangements not only remove or reduce the tension, they also have the potential to create and / or cement good relations between the States concerned and even act as confidence-building measures in their own right. Such arrangements have the added advantage that they are an overtly cooperative rather than confrontational mechanism for addressing an inter-State dispute. In essence, there is no 'winner' or 'loser' in the establishment of a co-operative arrangement, in a manner arguably dissimilar to, for example, the way in which the delimitation of a maritime boundary is often portrayed, for all that most successful boundary delimitations feature a healthy degree of compromise in order to be achieved.
Accordingly, the need to maintain and promote good relations represents an important underlying rationale for entering into co-operative or joint development arrangements.
A The conclusion of any joint development arrangement, in the absence of the appropriate level of consent between the parties, is merely redrafting the problem and possibly complicating it further.
B. Effective Management of Public Perception of Joint Development Arrangements
Public perception of a joint development arrangement plays a significant role in facilitating both the conclusion of such mechanisms and their successful implementation. In many of the arrangements under discussion, media portrayal and subsequent public reaction was a significant factor contributing to the success of 56 This was due in part to sporadic clashes along their land border in the vicinity of the Preah Vihear Similarly, after the 2008 China-Japan Arrangement, 58 while both parties agreed to establish a joint development zone, there was also a provision which allowed Japan to participate in the development of the Chunxiao Gas fields which lay on the Chinese side of the theoretical equidistance line. After the Arrangement was concluded, differing interpretations arose relating to the Chunxiao Gas field. Japan claimed that China and Japan were carrying out joint development of the Chunxiao Gas field whereas China argued that all they had allowed was capital participation of the Chinese and that Japan had acknowledged China's sovereign rights over
Chunxiao. This is one of the reasons why talks on the conclusion of a comprehensive joint development arrangement between China and Japan have been held up.
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The 2009 Malaysia-Brunei Arrangement 60 also met with controversy as the media (and certain former leaders of Malaysia) portrayed the arrangement as the 58 Supra note 4. 59 Reuters, 'Japan says China's oil production at the disputed Chunxiao gas field is regrettable' Energypedia News (10 March 2011), online: Energy-pedia.com <http://www.energypedia.com/news/china/japan-says-chinas-oil-production-at-the-disputed-chunxiao-gas-field-isregrettable>.
Malaysian Government being weak in having given up its sovereign rights to the overlapping area. clauses and so forth, will play a considerable role in demonstrating that a joint development arrangement is a 'win-win' situation for the parties concerned.
Second, States need to manage the expectations of their public. This includes refraining from stoking national sentiments when incidents occur which are perceived as a threat to national sovereignty and not taking unreasonable or extreme positions which are difficult to back down from. It also includes educating the public through the media and other avenues on the benefits of joint development and the fact that it does not involve a surrender of sovereignty.
C. Political Will of Parties
The co-operative arrangements in Asia were ultimately concluded because the States had the political will to make it happen. This political will needs to be sufficient to withstand domestic politics and changes in government. Of course, political will is an ambiguous concept and can be attributed to a number of factors, such as the presence of resources, as well as the need and existence of good relations.
However, it also highlights the importance of ensuring that joint development arrangements are drafted to withstand political changes. Exploration for and development of oil and gas resources commonly have a timetable measured in decades. Joint agreements for this purpose therefore have to provide for continuity and stability far beyond the likely tenure of the governments that enter into the particular joint arrangement. A robust joint regime and relationship is required if resource development is to be achieved over the long term.
